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Abstract This paper provides a thorough equilibrium analysis of a wage contract
negotiation model where the union must choose between strike and holdout between
offers and counter-offers. When the union and the firm have different discount factors,
delay in reaching an agreement may Pareto dominate many immediate agreements.
We derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs and characterize the equilibrium
strategy profiles that support these extreme equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.
In particular, our analysis clarifies open issues on the maximal wage in this model when
the union has a higher discount factor than the firm.
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JEL Classification C72 · C73 · C78
1 Introduction
In the contract negotiation model studied by Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller
(1991), and Haller and Holden (1990), a union and a firm negotiate a new contract
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after an old one expired. In contrast to Rubinstein (1982), the union decides whether
to strike or holdout after an offer is rejected in any period before they agree on a
new contract. Fernandez and Glazer (1991) show that an alternating-strike strategy
supports the maximal wage, the union’s best equilibrium payoff. This strategy profile
specifies that the union strikes (provided it is credible) only after its offer is rejected
and both make acceptable offers. Bolt (1995) demonstrates that, however, this strategy
profile fails to be an equilibrium when the union is more patient than the firm. Haller
(1991), and Haller and Holden (1990) consider the case in which both players have
the same discount factor and, therefore, Bolt’s (1995) criticism does not apply. Bolt
provides a no-concession strategy to the firm and shows that it can be sustained by
equilibrium. Recently, one of Slantchev’s (2003) claims implies that firm’s no-con-
cession strategy always supports the maximal wage when the union is more patient
than the firm. This, however, contradicts with Bolt’s (1993) finding that an always-
strike strategy profile sometimes yields an even higher payoff to the union. Instead
of invoking Shaked and Sutton’s (1984) method to derive extreme equilibrium pay-
offs, Bolt (1993, 1995) and Slantchev (2003) simply verify whether a given strategy
profile constitutes an equilibrium. Muthoo (1999) also notices this issue on extreme
equilibria in a general model of this kind, called the negotiation model due to Busch
and Wen (1995), and provides a set of bounds for equilibrium payoffs, that are not
necessarily the tightest bounds. Busch and Wen (1995) also deal with the case of a
common discount factor, so it is not subject to the current debate. This ongoing debate
is still not settled, because it is still unclear what has been missing in those studies
and what the union’s best equilibrium payoff is in this celebrated model, particularly
when the union is more patient than the firm.
In this paper, we explain why complications arise in analyzing the contract nego-
tiation model when the union and firm have different discount factors. It has been
noticed in other contexts that Pareto improvement is possible through intertemporal
trade between agents with different discount factors, see e.g., Ramsey (1928),
Bewley (1972), and more recently, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999). In the contract negoti-
ation model, such Pareto improvement is also possible through a delayed agreement,
which has not been formally recognized in the bargaining literature. Such Pareto
improvement could be so dramatic that it may lead to payoff vectors above the bar-
gaining frontier. This fact has been overlooked in most of the existing studies in this
literature, and implies that we should also question the validity of the method used in
these studies. More specifically, it is not innocent to assume that players always reach
an agreement, or equivalently, players’ continuation payoffs are always bounded by
the bargaining frontier when applying Shaked and Sutton’s (1984) technique.
For that reason, we formally incorporate the possibility of unacceptable offers
in deriving extreme equilibrium payoffs in the contract negotiation model. In this
paper, we confirm and validate Fernandez and Glazer’s (1991) analysis if and only if
the union is less patient than the firm. When the union is more patient than the firm,
however, the assumption that the continuation payoffs are always bounded by the
bargaining frontier is violated. Depending upon the discount factors, we completely
characterize all extreme equilibria in this model. Roughly speaking, when the firm’s
discount factor is not far below the union’s, delay happens in the union’s best equi-
librium. In this case, the firm adopts the no-concession strategy against the union’s
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alternating-strike strategy. The rationale for the firm to choose its no-concession
strategy is that the continuation payoff from delay is above the bargaining frontier
due to their different discount factors. Consequently, there is no mutually acceptable
agreement available. However, delay for more than one period would not be effective
in supporting the union’s best equilibrium. When the firm’s discount factor is signif-
icantly below the union’s, the alternating-strike strategy is no longer effective since
the union can manoeuvre the firm in a worse situation with its always-strike strategy,
even though now the firm makes acceptable offers.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) are the first to consider the possibility of making
unacceptable offers in Rubinstein (1982). Since all continuation payoffs are bounded
by the bargaining frontier in Rubinstein (1982), it is without loss of generality to
examine acceptable offers only when applying Shaked and Sutton’s (1984) technique.
As discussed, this is no longer true in the contract negotiation model. As shown in
our analysis, the same holds in the stochastic bargaining model of Merlo and Wilson
(1995, 1998). As Merlo and Wilson (1995) explain on p. 372, however, their model
excludes the contract negotiation model studied here. Since the contract negotiation
model lies outside the scope of these references, our findings here are similar to theirs,
but resulting from a different extension.
Finally, Houba and van Lomwel (2001) study the maximal wage strategies of
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) under short-term contracts, common discount factors,
and productivity growth where intertemporal trade cannot take place. Such growth
makes the union less patient than the firm and, for that reason, they forego investi-
gating equilibrium bounds. Our results hint that there is no reason to explicitly derive
such bounds in their model.
2 The model
Consider the contract negotiation model of Fernandez and Glazer (1991). After con-
tract w0 ∈ [0, 1] expires, a union and a firm, called players u and f , negotiate how
to share firm’s future gross profit, normalized to be 1 per period, over infinitely many
periods. The union makes offers in all even periods (including period 0) and the firm
makes offers in all odd periods. In contrast to Rubinstein (1982), the union decides
whether to strike or holdout in any period after an offer is rejected. During strike, both
the union and the firm receive 0. During holdout, the union receives w0 and the firm
receives 1 −w0. From any outcome path of the model, a player receives the sum of its
discounted payoffs from all periods. Denote player i’s discount factor as δi ∈ (0, 1)
for i = u and f . For all (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and w0 ∈ [0, 1], there is a stationary
SPE (subgame perfect equilibrium) where the union receives w0 and the firm receives
1 − w0 in every period. Obviously, this stationary SPE is simultaneously the union’s
worst equilibrium and the firm’s best equilibrium. What is less clear is the union’s best
SPE (the firm’s worst SPE), which is the key issue of the current debate.
An important issue that has not been properly addressed is the Pareto frontier of all
possible continuation payoffs. In Rubinstein (1982), this Pareto frontier simply con-
sists of all possible agreements, i.e., the bargaining frontier {(w, 1 − w) : w ∈ [0, 1]},
whether players have the same discount factor or not. Unlike Rubinstein (1982), some
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feasible outcomes may lead to payoffs strictly above the bargaining frontier when the
union and the firm have different discount factors. For example, consider a feasible
outcome path where the union holds out for T periods, followed by an agreement
w ∈ [0, 1]. The sum of their payoffs
[(
1−δTu
)
w0+δTu w
]
+
[(
1−δTf
)
(1−w0)+δTf (1−w)
]
=1+
(
δTu − δTf
)
(w − w0) ,
which is equal to 1 if δu = δ f . The resulting payoff vector, however, is above the
bargaining frontier if either δu < δ f and w < w0, or δu > δ f and w > w0. Therefore,
not all continuation payoffs are bounded from above by the bargaining frontier. This
implies that the Pareto frontier consists of two parts. For example in case δu > δ f ,
for all w ≤ w0 this frontier coincides with the bargaining frontier for all, while for
all w > w0 it must lie above the bargaining frontier because the sum of payoffs is
above 1.
In the context of repeated games, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) demonstrate how to
construct Pareto optimal outcome paths from two payoff vectors when two players
have different discount factors. A feasible outcome path in the contract negotiation
model is not as flexible as in a repeated game. By default, an agreement ceases any
future payoff variation. Accordingly, a Pareto efficient outcome path must consist of
the union’s holdout for T ≥ 0 periods with probability 1 − p ∈ [0, 1] and for T + 1
periods with probability p, followed by either w = 1 when δu > δ f , or w = 0 when
δu < δ f .1 To have such a continuation in an equilibrium, two players have to eventu-
ally agree on an equilibrium contract. Since neither w = 1 nor w = 0 is an equilibrium
contract in this model, all Pareto efficient outcome paths with a sum of payoffs above
the bargaining frontier are unachievable in equilibrium. Instead, we need to consider
continuations with w being the minimum equilibrium contract when δu < δ f and w
being the maximum equilibrium contract in case of δu > δ f . Since no equilibrium
contract can be less than w0, there will be no effective continuation payoff above the
bargaining frontier in supporting the maximal wage when δu < δ f . This validates
previous analysis on this issue in this case. On other hand, when δu > δ f , we must
consider feasible continuation payoffs above the bargaining frontier in supporting the
maximal wage, which is why the conventional analysis breaks down.
3 Necessary conditions and unacceptable offers
In order to derive the union’s highest SPE payoff, it is necessary to incorporate unac-
ceptable offers in applying Shaked and Sutton’s (1984) technique. Let Mu be the
supremum of the union’s SPE payoffs in any even period where the union makes an
offer, and m f be the infimum of the firm’s SPE payoffs in any odd period where the
firm makes an offer. Note that both Mu and m f generally depend on (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2
and w0 ∈ [0, 1]. Since w0 is the union’s worst SPE payoff, we have
1 Here, players are allowed to play correlated strategies for technical simplicity, so that the Pareto frontier
can be described by a continuous function.
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w0 ≤ Mu ≤ 1 and w0 ≤ 1 − m f ≤ 1. (1)
In what follows, we derive a set of necessary conditions for Mu and m f by analyzing
players’ equilibrium strategies in the union’s best possible situation.
In any odd period, the firm may make either an unacceptable offer or an irresistible
offer that will certainly induce the union to accept. If the union holds out after rejecting
the firm’s offer, the union will receive at most (1−δu)w0 +δu Mu and certainly accepts
any offer that is higher. Thus, the firm could obtain, at least, 1 − (1 − δu)w0 − δu Mu
from making the least irresistible offer. Alternatively, the firm could obtain at least
(1 − δ f )(1 − w0) + δ f (1 − Mu) = 1 − (1 − δ f )w0 − δ f Mu
from making any unacceptable offer. The firm will make either the least irresistible
offer or an unacceptable offer; whichever yields a higher value to the firm. Note that
holdout is always credible for the union to carry out after rejecting a firm’s offer.
On the other hand, if the union strikes after rejecting the firm’s offer, the union’s
continuation payoffs will not be more than δu Mu . The firm will obtain at least 1−δu Mu
from making the least irresistible offer, or δ f (1 − Mu) from making an unacceptable
offer. Due to (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and Mu ≤ 1, we have (δu − δ f )Mu ≤ 1 − δ f and,
therefore,
δ f (1 − Mu) ≤ 1 − δu Mu, (2)
which implies that the firm will never make an unacceptable offer if the union threatens
to strike after rejecting the firm’s offer. Unlike holdout, strike is credible if and only
if δu Mu ≥ w0, i.e., the union’s highest continuation payoff is not less than w0 due to
the stationary SPE.
Obviously, m f cannot be less than the minimum (with respect to either holdout or
strike) of the firm’s highest continuation payoff from making either the least irresist-
ible offer or an unacceptable offer. That is, for all (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and w0 ∈ [0, 1],
m f ≥ min
⎧⎨
⎩
max
{
1 − (1 − δu)w0 − δu Mu, (3a)
1 − (1 − δ f )w0 − δ f Mu, (3b)
1 − δu Mu subject to δu Mu ≥ w0, (3c)
(3)
Note that if we did not consider the possibility of unacceptable offers, (3b) would
disappear and (3) would simply reduce to (3c), which would yield flawed results in
Sect. 4. From condition (3), we obtain
Proposition 1 For all (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and w0 ∈ [0, 1],
m f ≥
⎧⎨
⎩
1 − δu Mu, if (δu − δ f )Mu ≥ (1 − δ f )w0,
1 − (1 − δ f )w0 − δ f Mu, if (δu − δ f )Mu <(1 − δ f )w0, δ f <δu,
1 − (1 − δu)w0 − δu Mu, if δ f ≥ δu.
(4)
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The proofs of this and all other propositions are deferred to the appendix. The
condition in the first case of (4) implies both δ f < δu and the credibility constraint for
(3c). Consequently, the union would never strike after rejecting a firm’s offer when
δ f ≥ δu . The firm makes an unacceptable offer if and only if the continuation payoffs
Pareto dominate an immediate agreement, which is the second case of (4), because
for δ f < δu the sum of their continuation payoffs is
(1−δu)w0+δu Mu +(1−δ f )(1−w0)+δ f (1 − Mu)=1 + (δu − δ f )(Mu − w0) ≥ 1.
In any even period, if the union holds out after its offer is rejected, the firm will
receive no less than (1−δ f )(1−w0)+δ f m f by rejecting the union’s offer. Therefore,
the union’s SPE payoffs cannot be more than 1−(1−δ f )(1−w0)−δm f from making
the least acceptable offer, or (1 − δu)w0 + δu(1 − m f ) from making an unacceptable
offer.
Likewise, the union may threaten to strike if the firm rejects its offer, which is
credible if and only if δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0. In this situation, the union’s SPE payoffs
cannot be more than 1 − δ f m f from making the least acceptable offer, or δu(1 − m f )
from making an unacceptable offer. Given (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and m f ≥ 0, we have
1 − δu ≥ (δ f − δu)m f if and only if 1 − δ f m f ≥ δu(1 − m f ), (5)
which implies that if the union threatens to strike, the union will not make an unac-
ceptable offer to the firm in an even period. To summarize, the union’s SPE payoffs
cannot be more than the maximum of the union’s continuation payoffs from all three
possible cases discussed above. That is, for all (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and w0 ∈ [0, 1],
Mu ≤ max
⎧⎨
⎩
1 − (1 − δ f )(1 − w0) − δ f m f , (6a)
(1 − δu)(1 − w0) + δu(1 − m f ), (6b)
1 − δ f m f , subject to δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0. (6c)
(6)
Again, if we ignored the possibility of unacceptable offers, then (6b) would disappear
from (6), which would also introduce flawed results. From (6), we obtain
Proposition 2 For all (δu, δ f ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and w0 ∈ [0, 1], we have
Mu ≤
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 − δ f m f , if δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0,
1 − (1 − δ f )(1 − w0) − δ f m f , if δu(1 − m f ) < w0, δ f ≥ δu,
1 − (1 − δu)(1 − w0) − δum f , if δu(1 − m f ) < w0, δ f < δu .
(7)
4 The union’s best SPE
We now derive the union’s best SPE payoff from the necessary conditions obtained in
the previous section. To simplify the exposition, we will consider the cases of δ f ≥ δu
and δ f < δu , respectively.
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Fig. 1 The sets A, B and C for w0 = 0.3
Proposition 3 When δu ≤ δ f , (4) and (7) yield
Mu =
{
w0 + (1−δ f )(1−w0)1−δuδ f ,
w0,
m f =
{
(1−δu)(1−w0)
1−δuδ f , if
(
δu, δ f
) ∈ A,
w0, if
(
δu, δ f
)
/∈ A, (8)
where A =
{
(δu, δ f ) : δu ≤ δ f , δu(δu − w0)δ f ≤ (1 − w0)δ2u + w0δu − w0
}
. (9)
Proposition 3 validates Fernandez and Glazer’s (1991) finding on the union’s best
SPE if and only if δu ≤ δ f . Their Lemma 4 provides the SPE strategy profile to
support Mu and m f for (δu, δ f ) ∈ A. Strike is credible if and only if (δu, δ f ) ∈ A, as
illustrated in Fig. 1, which requires that the union be patient enough, at least δu > w0,
and the firm’s discount factor be bounded by
δ f ≤ (1 − w0)δ
2
u + w0δu − w0
δu(δu − w0) .
When δ f < δu , the union best SPE becomes more complicated since it is possible
to have continuation payoffs above the bargaining frontier.
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Proposition 4 When δ f < δu, (4) and (7) yield
Mu =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1+w0δ f
1+δ f ,
1−δ f
1−δuδ f ,
w0,
m f =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1−w0
1+δ f , if
(
δu, δ f
) ∈ B,
1−δu
1−δuδ f , if
(
δu, δ f
) ∈ C,
1 − w0, if
(
δu, δ f
)
/∈ B ∪ C,
(10)
where B =
{
(δu, δ f ) : δ f <δu, δ f ≥ δu −w01−δuw0 , (δu −w0)δ f ≥ w0(1−δu)
}
, (11)
C =
{
(δu, δ f ) : δ f ≤ δu −w01−δuw0 , (δu −w0)δ f ≤
δ2u −w0
δu
}
. (12)
For (δu, δ f ) ∈ B, Proposition 4 implies that the union’s alternating-strike strat-
egy and the firm’s no-concession strategy suggested by Bolt (1995), also implied by
Slantchev (2003), constitute the union’s best SPE. In this case, the union is patient
enough to threaten to strike, but the firm is unable to gain from making the least irre-
sistible offer. As illustrated in Fig. 1, for given δ f , δu is too low for the union to benefit
from the always-strike strategy. As a consequence, the firm capitalizes 1 − w0 every
other period. For (δu, δ f ) ∈ C , however, Proposition 4 implies that the always-strike
strategy suggested by Bolt (1993) implements the union’s best SPE. In this second
case, the union’s best SPE features immediate agreement in every subgame since the
corresponding continuation payoff is bounded from above by the bargaining frontier.
When (δu, δ f ) /∈ A ∪ B ∪ C , the contract negotiation model has a unique SPE
where the union receives w0. The union’s best SPE payoff is continuous, except on
the left boundary of A∪ B∪ C where strike just becomes credible and the union’s best
SPE payoff jumps to a level above w0.
As a final result, there are many equilibria whose payoffs are above the bargaining
frontier when (δu, δ f ) ∈ B ∪ C . Consider the following pure strategy profile: The
union holds out for T > 0 periods during which no party makes acceptable offers,
followed by the union’s best equilibrium. Such a strategy profile is a SPE that is not
Pareto dominated by any other SPE, because of the discussion in Sect. 2. The correla-
tion device in Sect. 2 may be assumed to connect these points. As a consequence, all
SPE with immediate agreement, except the union’s worst and best SPE, are not Pareto
efficient and delay is Pareto improving.
To summarize, our paper settles a long-standing debate concerning on the contract
negotiation model when players have different discount factors: efficient delay has
been overlooked and its presence requires a careful and modified implementation of
Shaked and Sutton’s (1984) method. More importantly, our paper raises the aware-
ness of a similar issue in the bargaining literature at large: In many applications of
Shaked and Sutton’s backward induction argument, it is often presumed that continu-
ation payoffs are bounded from above by the bargaining frontier without verification
of this presumption. Our paper emphasizes that we need to verify any presumption in
such analysis for its integrity.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 In this proof, we will identify when each of the three cases in
(3) applies to bound the value of m f .
First, if δu ≤ δ f , then m f ≥ (3a) because (3a) ≥ (3b) due to (1) and (3c) > (3a)
due to (1 − δu)w0 > 0. This establishes the last case in (4).
Second, if δ f < δu , then (3b) > (3a) due to (1 ). Condition (33) implies that m f
is not less than the minimum of (3b) and (3c). Notice that
(3b) < (3c) if and only if (δu − δ f )Mu < (1 − δ f )w0.
Therefore, if δ f < δu and (δu − δ f )Mu < (1 − δ f )w0, condition (3) implies that
m f ≥ (3b), which establishes the second case in (4).
Lastly, if δ f < δu and (δu − δ f )Mu ≥ (1 − δ f )w0, then (3c) ≤ (3b) and strike is
credible because δu Mu − w0 ≥ δ f (Mu − w0) ≥ 0 due to (1). Hence, condition (3)
implies m f ≥ (3c), which is the first case of (4). In the first case of (4), the credibility
constraint is implied by the condition stated for this case. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 First, when strike is not credible, i.e., δu(1 − m f ) < w0, Mu
is less than or equal to the maximum of (6a) and (6b). Then δu(1−m f ) ≤ w0 implies
that (6a) ≥ (6b) if and only if δ f ≥ δu , which establish the last two cases in (7).
Second, when strike is credible, i.e., δu(1−m f ) ≥ w0, it is obvious that (6c) ≥ (6a)
since (1 − δ f )(1 − w0) ≥ 0. It is also true that (6c) ≥ (6b) since
(6c) ≥ (6b) if and only if (1 − δu)(1 − w0) ≥ (δ f − δu)m f ,
which is trivial due to the fact of m f ≤ 1 − w0 by (1) and δ f < 1. Therefore,
Mu ≤ (6c) when δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0, the first case of (7). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 When δ f ≥ δu , there are two possible cases to consider from
(4) and (7)
Case 1 Suppose that δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0. (4) and (7) then imply that
m f ≥ (1 − δu)(1 − w0) + δu(1 − Mu) and Mu ≤ 1 − δ f m f ,
which yield the upper bound of Mu and the lower bound of m f as stated in the
first part of (8). Substituting the lower bound of m f into the credibility constraint
δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0, we have
δu
[
1 − (1 − δu)(1 − w0)
1 − δuδ f
]
≥ w0.
From the last inequality, we obtain
δu(δu − w0)δ f ≤ (1 − w0)δ2u + w0δu − w0,
which is true if and only if (δu, δ f ) ∈ A as defined by ( 9) when δu ≤ δ f .
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Case 2 Suppose that δu(1 − m f ) < w0. Inequalities (4) and (7) imply that
m f ≥ (1 − δu)(1 − w0) + δu(1 − Mu) and Mu ≤ 1 − (1 − δu)(1 − w0) − δum f ,
which yields m f ≥ 1−w0 and Mu ≤ w0. Together with (1), we have Mu = 1−m f =
w0, the second part of (8 ). In this case, strike is obviously not credible and there is a
unique SPE. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 When δ f < δu , we need to consider the following four possi-
ble cases from (4) and (7)
Case 1 Suppose that (δu − δ f )Mu ≥ (1 − δ f )w0 and δu(1 − m f ) < w0. Inequalities
(4) and (7) then imply that
m f ≥ 1 − δu Mu and Mu ≤ (1 − δu)w0 + δu(1 − m f ),
which yield Mu ≤ 11+δu w0 < w0. However, this contradicts with the fact that Mu ≥
w0 by (1). Therefore, Case 1 is not possible.
Case 2 Suppose that (δu − δ f )Mu < (1 − δ f )w0 and δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0. Inequalities
(4) and (7) imply that
m f ≥ (1 − δ f )(1 − w0) + δ f (1 − Mu) and Mu ≤ 1 − δ f m f ,
which yield the upper bound of Mu and the lower bound of m f as stated in the first
part of (10). With these bounds, we have
(δu − δ f )Mu < (1 − δ f )w0 if and only if (1 − w0δu)δ f > δu − w0,
δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0 if and only if (δu − w0)δ f ≥ (1 − δu)w0,
which are true if and only if (δu, δ f ) ∈ B defined by (11). This establishes the first
part of (10).
Case 3 Suppose that (δu − δ f )Mu ≥ (1 − δ f )w0 and δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0. Inequalities
(4) and (7) then imply that
m f ≥ 1 − δu Mu and Mu ≤ 1 − δ f m f ,
which yield the upper bound of Mu and the lower bound of m f as stated in the second
part of (10). These bounds are the SPE payoffs in Bolt (1995) corresponding to the
always-strike strategies. With these bounds, we have
(δu − δ f )Mu ≥ (1 − δ f )w0 if and only if (1 − w0δu)δ f ≤ δu,
δu(1 − m f ) ≥ w0 if and only if δ f δu(δu − w0) ≥ δ2u − w0,
which are true if and only if (δu, δ f ) ∈ C defined by (12). This establishes the second
part of (10).
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Case 4 Suppose that (δu − δ f )Mu ≤ (1 − δ f )w0 and δu(1 − m f ) < w0. (4) and (7)
imply that
m f ≥ (1 − δ f )(1 − w0) + δ f (1 − Mu) and Mu ≤ (1 − δu)w0 + δu(1 − m f ),
which yield that Mu ≤ w0 and m f ≥ 1 − w0. Obviously, the two conditions for this
case hold. Together with (1), we have Mu = 1 − m f = w0, which establishes the last
part of (10) where there is a unique SPE. unionsq
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